West Papua: Special Treatment

A very interesting article by Erica Vowles on Papua Issue....

West Papua: Special Treatment
By: Erica Vowles
Wednesday 22 August 2007
The rights and revenue that were supposed to flow from West Papua’s Special Autonomy Law — implemented by the Indonesian Government in 2001 — are yet to transpire for the majority of West Papuans, according to delegates at a conference in Sydney last week.

‘Most of them don’t know what Special Autonomy is,’ said J Budi Hernawan, director of the Jayapura-based Office for Justice and Peace, at the Paths to Justice and Prosperity conference at Sydney University last Thursday. ‘They hear that the money will be available but they are waiting and nothing happens.’

Hernawan believes that the Papuan political elite are too distracted by the fight over resources to implement real changes in the standard of living for Papuans.

There is a power struggle amongst the elites but for their own interests. The ongoing creation of new provinces is simply in the interests of political parties and the incumbent government officials, and I think that for most Papuans, looking at many different statistics in the area of HIV/Aids, health, education, the money does not go to their level. Where does it go? Don’t ask me, better you ask the politicians.

And while Special Autonomy was supposed to lead to a reduction in troop levels, Agus Alue Alua, Chairman of the Papuan People’s Assembly, says numbers have escalated sharply since 2001, with concerning consequences.

Human rights violations are part of the Military presence — [they are] never [conducted by] outsiders — and during the Special Autonomy Law, the Military presence has increased. That means that military human rights abuses have [also] increased.

Hernawan says that while human rights abuses have not yet reached the scales seen in Aceh and East Timor, the population nevertheless remains terrorised.

In May we received a report of torture in Wamena [in the Central Highlands]. A person stole money, he confessed that he stole that money from a solider, but it didn’t stop there. They tortured him in public. This is a way to say to the community ‘we have the authority to do what ever we want to control you.’

Faced with the ongoing impunity of the Indonesian Military, the thoughts of many Papuans inevitably turn to independence, says Hernawan.

I think many Papuans still want independence, and I believe it’s an expression of the desperate situation. They don’t see the concrete progress of welfare, they don’t see that their fundamental freedoms and their fundamental rights are respected, protected, so basically they have nothing to lose in their support for independence.

With the province seemingly bogged down in a quagmire of competing problems — a lack of political will from Jakarta to implement necessary legislation, resistance if not outright opposition to autonomy from the military and a Papuan political elite potentially lining their own pockets — one could be forgiven for thinking that aspiring for independence is naive and short sighted. However, Dr John Otto Ondawame, International Spokesperson for the Free West Papua Movement and member of the Papuan Presidium, refuses to accept autonomy as anything other than a bridge to independence.

Any discussion of autonomy should clearly spell out the possibility to give Papuans the opportunity to decide if they want to be part of Indonesia or a separate State and there should be an option for a referendum after 15 years, or 20 years. In West Papua, Special Autonomy law never spelled it out clearly on this matter.

As far as West Papuan people are concerned, as far as OPM is concerned, we don’t trust Jakarta.

Faced with allegations of corruption at a local level, I ask Ondawame how he proposed to prevent this scourge from continuing to pollute an independent West Papua.

‘A culture of corruption is not only in West Papua, it’s part of the world community,’ says Ondawame.

So of course it’s very hard to say we will be free from corruption. But we have to look into the legal system to prevent any further corruptions resulting from the large amounts of money.

The legal system must be strengthened, democratic values have to be strengthened, and institutions have to be established in order to prevent this sort of corruption. We don’t want to continue the Indonesian style of corruption in West Papua.

Any discussions of self-determination in the Asia Pacific region also invoke inevitable comparisons with unstable nation States like the Solomon Islands and the world’s youngest country, Timor Leste.

Director of the Australia Asia Pacific Institute at Victoria University, Dr Richard Chauvel, concedes that the shopping list of problems currently plaguing Papua — the HIV/AIDS pandemic, labour problems associated with the Freeport gold mine in Timika, corruption, poor health services and education problems — would continue to blight the province, whether it was independent or autonomous. However, he believes comparisons with neighbouring Papua New Guinea, which has its own problems with political corruption, are too simplistic.

‘I’ve always been disinclined to make the simple comparisons over the border, or elsewhere out into the further South Pacific and say from that that West Papua is going to be another failed State.’

He says the historical legacy of the Dutch colonial masters’ moves to educate a ruling elite in preparedness for handover to Papuan independence — an event that was stymied by the Act of Free Choice in 1969 — needs to be appreciated, along with the skills the elite in West Papua already have, which have been honed from a difficult operational environment.

‘By highlighting all the problems that an independent Papua or even an autonomous Papua would confront is not saying that it is doomed to be a failed State. But it would inevitably be a fairly difficult place to govern.’

For his part, Ondawame believes the Asia Pacific region’s more troubled countries — like the Solomon Islands, Fiji and Timor Leste — are not failed States but emerging States.

European nation States weren’t free from being ‘failed States’ in the 16th and 17th centuries. They went through a similar experience. Now the Melansian States, or perhaps other third world countries, are going through the same experience. And that’s a process that will need to be gone through for a few generations until the population comes to respect some fundamental level of democratic rights.

However, Chauvel points out that an independent West Papuan State would face a series of challenges, not least the thousands of Indonesian migrants who now call West Papua home, some going back generations. Then there would be the ongoing issue of the Freeport gold Mine in Timika.

‘The enclave mining operation at the Freeport mine in Timika is essentially Indonesian settler run and dominated,’ says Chauvel.

How would an independent West Papua deal with an economy that is essentially run by outsiders? That would be a particularly important issue. An independent Papua would face all of the problems that PNG has faced dealing with large multi-national corporations; an independent Papua would be highly dependent on the revenue generated by Freeport.

However, Dino Kusnadi, spokesperson for the Indonesian embassy in Australia, maintains that not enough time has been given to enable Special Autonomy to work as well as moves to reform the Indonesian Military to take effect.

My argument is that on the table you have Special Autonomy — wide ranging autonomy, it’s on the table — [the] best way forward is to make that work. We’ve seen today that there is a lot of incompetence within the local Government or even the [Indonesian] Government but again out of this incompetence at least there should be an enlightenment process about how to get that job done.

Some of his sentiments were shared by Franz Albert Joku, Chairman of IGSSARPRI (Independent Group Supporting the Special Autonomous Region of Papua within the Republic of Indonesia). While remaining a believer in Papuan self-determination and conceding that Jakarta still needed to implement aspects of Special Autonomy, he maintains Papuans must work within the current framework.

Papuans should have every reason to now, I believe, firmly embrace Special Autonomy however diluted, imperfect or incomplete [it] may be in the present form, realistically there is no other option on the table right now that we can legitimately discuss and pursue.

For Papuans, the reality of living with a Special Autonomy that is ‘diluted, imperfect and incomplete’ often means occupying the lowest rung in the economy of their own province. It also means living with torture — or the threat of it — that is ongoing and unchecked.






About the Author

Erica Vowles is the Sydney-based Producer of The Wire, a national current affairs program broadcast on community and Indigenous radio. She is also the Australian correspondent for US current affairs radio program Free Speech Radio News.

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The Hardliners on Either Side Need Each Other

I just read an enlightened article from Contradiction Blog with title Who supports what? I should congratulate the way the writer put the objective situation in Papua Indonesia.

It seems to me that the writer is a field researcher or activist who really understand that to distinct between different positions in Papua is often obscured. This may be too simple when we talk about the complexity of Papua's picture. This may be the situation is really that simple and we can ignore the complexity which has been made for 40 years.

I would like to share the article in this blog so all elements of Papuan Leaders can see the problem from a new angle; imparsial and in the name of Papuan people, not to take side and struggle in the name of personal intention.

Here is the article....

I went up to the conference on ‘Paths to Justice and Prosperity in Papua’ last week, and it was insightful, confirming some ideas, and demolishing others.

My experience of activism has been a somewhat frustrating one. While groups I’ve been involved with have often had very worthwhile aims, the methods and strategy used have often been less than they could have been. So it was interesting to attend a conference that was equally pitched at activist and academic contexts, and to be a somewhat impartial observer - that’s not to say I came without ideas, or that I don’t support certain concepts, but rather that I wasn’t perceived as belonging to any particular group.


It seems to me at this stage that the distinction between different positions in Papua is often obscured or put aside. This may be to create a simpler picture, or because acknowledging other positions would recognise the challenge these pose.

The most significant of the questions facing Papuans (and thus those internationally who advocate for or with Papuans), is whether to support special autonomy (Otonomi Khusus, Otsus). The Special Autonomy package gives the region a much greater share of the national budget than it would otherwise receive, and in theory, greater political autonomy and special decision making powers. However, since it was made law in 2001, conditions have not changed significantly, and in some cases have got worse. This is not however, a problem entirely caused by the Republic of Indonesia (RI) [I use the terminology RI to separate the government from the people - I’ve seen racism slip in where the distinction is obscured], rather, the distribution of funds to various levels of government in Papua (now overwhelmingly run by Papuans) has caused greater inefficiency, and exacerbated high levels of corruption. It’s failure is also in part due to the presence of the Indonesian military (TNI).

And is it the ‘only game in town’? There are those who think that the RI is unlikely to make greater political concessions in the near future, so making the best of Otsus is the best move at this point. And there are others who believe that Otsus stands in the way of eventual independence, and was offered by the RI as a compromise position. As someone who sees the RI as being in a position of strength, the former position seems more real, but I acknowledge that others see things in a different way.

One question that stood out at me was ‘Is the international activist movement making things worse for the people of West Papua?’In a conversation with another attendee, I had to agree that the TNI needed the continued violence, or perception of violence generated by the OPM (Free Papua Movement) and vocal separatists in order to justify its heavy presence. In the world that the TNI inhabits, defending the unitary Republic of Indonesia trumps human rights. In turn, the human rights abuses and injustice caused by the TNI are fuel for those opposing the presence of the RI in any form. Quite simply, the hardliners on either side need each other. There also seems to be a degree of naivety among some activists, who give prominence to factors that would seem to bolster the possibility of West Papua gaining full political independence, and underplay factors that challenge this. This isn’t to excuse the activities of the Indonesian military and police in West Papua, nor to undermine efforts to challenge this behaviour, but rather to acknowledge the situation as it presently exists.

Another question that arose was whether the international solidarity movement was in fact giving false hope to West Papuans, by interpreting the international situation so as to present a picture where independence was still a possibility. As I asked in a question to a panel member, while a solution was reached in East Timor (and to a lesser extent Aceh), that came through a quite unique set of political circumstances, and these have in some cases have been reversed in the case of Papua. While a movement is not possible without at least a glimmer of hope, acting on a false hope means that you end up with much less than you might otherwise. This was highlighted near the end, where Clinton Fernandes challenged John Ondawame over the eventuality of a Papuan state. In conversation afterwards an activist remarked to me that they thought that his challenge was quite inappropriate. I remarked that I thought otherwise, and that a movement with unrealistic perceptions would only do itself and Papuans damage. We didn’t really get the opportunity to discuss this in greater detail, which I would have liked, as it isn’t my aim to criticise without offering alternatives!

In this conflict, the rights of ordinary Papuans are squeezed, not only through military and police oppression, but in limiting the space available for those delivering essential services such as health and education. It’s hard to describe the feeling I have towards all of this - but I do worry that the issues that will most effect Papuans in the next 20 years, independent of the political status of West Papua, are being pushed to the side. Some of these, such as the very rapid increase in HIV infections, are worrying indeed.

The above contains a number of (necessary?) (over)simplifications, and this is still very much thinking out loud. Forgive me if it seems overly critical, but I feel like I need to give the above as context for later thinking I have planned.

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Democracy within West Papua Special Autonomy

After the New Order Suharto regime stepped down in 1998, the aspiration for democracy was aired throughout West Papua and other parts of Indonesia. East Timor was given options to vote for independence or autonomy within Indonesia because East Timor has a strong historical background as non Dutch colony, whereas other parts of Indonesia, particularly Acheh and West Papua was given the special autonomy, democratically offered by Jakarta.

Special autonomy was given to West Papua based on Autonomy Bill for West Papua No.21 of 21 November 2001a. While regional autonomy was offered to other provinces (according to the Bill of Regional Autonomy No. 22 of 1999).

According to the UN Declaration on Democracy [Declaration of the UN on Democracy, Adopted by Inter-Parliamentary Group Council, on its 161st session, (in Cairo, 16 September 1997) in DEMOCRACY: Its principles and achievement, Inter Parliamentary Union, Geneva: 1998], the fundamental function of a state is to guarantee the civil, cultural, economic, political, and social rights. Democracy goes hand in hand with an effective government, honest and transparent, freely chosen and responsible for public governance.

One of the free expressions of Papuan people is that they neither accepted nor refused special autonomy package that entered into force on 1 January 2002. West Papuan want to accept the offer with guarantee of improvement in all sectors of development but a small number of opportunist try to politicize the special autonomy simply because they don't get the access for economic and political control.

The Special Autonomy Bill has considerable impacts to the livelihood and survival of indigenous Papuans. It will create a democratic atmosephere that will be very conducive for regional development, and at the same time will facilitate the process of cross cutural communication.

West Papuan are Indonesian, the same human being with the same right and opportunity and equal in the development process. The special autonomy is a challenge for all human being who live in West Papua to help each other, to work hand in hand, for the betterment of the future.

However, the Liberation Army of Free Papua Movement (TPN/OPM) is always terrorizing West Papuan to create chaos and to stop the process of democratization. It is not true that the use of local languages as well as the use or practice of traditional identities and symbols has been banned by local or central government. In contrast the creation of Majelis Rakyat Papua (Papua People's Assembly) has opened a wide opportunity for all Papuan people to support the development, the democratic system and also the creation of West Papuan identity. We are West Papuan and We are also Indonesian. We have the right to join any activities in local and federal level. As an example, we can see our Papuan brother such as Mr. Fredy Numbery as a Minister in the central government of Indonesia.

The organs and systems for democratic governance in West Papua are in the right place. The democratic elements of the autonomy bill is including the establishment of the Papua People’s Assembly (MRP), which considers the voices of tribal elders, religious leaders, and other elements of the community. However, the challenge for most of tribal elders, leaders of youth and women, and religious leaders maybe too big and too difficult especially when they should deal with a complicated situation among them. It is very difficult to reach a consensus for many issues of development.

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Root of Conflict and Peace Agendas for Papua

A nice article from Jakarta Post

by Muridan S. Widjojo

The meeting between Vice President Jusuf Kalla, flanked by Coordinating Minister for Political, Legal and Security Affairs Widodo AS, Minister of Home Affairs Mohammad Ma'ruf and Indonesian Military (TNI) chief Gen. Endriartono Sutarto, and the official leaders of the province of Papua on Nov. 24, followed by the talks with the leaders of West Irian Jaya province the next day, resulted in a positive consensus.

The conflict over the election of local leaders in West Irian Jaya will be settled based on Law No. 21/2001 on special autonomy and Government Regulation No. 54/2004 on the Papuan People's Assembly (MRP). This implies that the process of creating a legal umbrella for West Irian Jaya will start with a white paper drafted by the governor of Papua, which will then be studied by the Papuan provincial council and brought to the MRP for approval. Subsequently, it will be forwarded to the central government via the minister of home Affairs.

This process is expected to last a month. According to the consensus, the central government will issue a regulation in lieu of law to provide legal protection for West Irian Jaya. If Jakarta firmly adheres to the accord, the door will likely be open for a comprehensive resolution of the root causes of the Papuan conflict.

However, it is worth noting that the agreement was reached only after the provincial council and MRP had rejected the unilateral plan by the Ministry of Home Affairs to hold local elections in West Irian Jaya, and threatened to reject the government initiated special autonomy and demand a referendum. This threat reflected the pinnacle of disappointment and anger among Papuan people and provincial leaders at the government's arbitrary policies and disregard for the Special Autonomy Law.

The success of Vice President Jusuf Kalla in breaking the political deadlock in Papua is in fact only superficial. The conflict over the elections in West Irian Jaya is just a small symptom of a much bigger problem.

Throughout 2005, the central government and provincial administration found themselves at loggerheads over a number of issues. The most significant consequence of this was a high level of Papuan dissatisfaction with the application of special autonomy, as manifested in the demonstration by 15,000 people organized by the Papuan Tribal Council in August.

Their reasons are obvious.

First, socioeconomic development in the region is making little significant progress. The public health service is seen as inadequate, and the HIV/AIDS question is not being properly handled. The education sector remains plagued by a lack of facilities and teachers. Widespread poverty amid Papua's natural riches is still the order of the day.

Second, little progress has been made on the human rights and state violence questions. To mention but a few cases, the legal process in respect of grave rights violations in Wamena and Wasior has stalled in the Attorney General's Office. A 2004 military operation in Puncak Jaya (2004) that resulted in serious rights abuses has not even been officially reported yet. Worse still, the first permanent Human Rights Tribunal (2005) has failed to punish rights violators in Abepura (2000). The victims in the case were taken aback by a defense attorney's statement that the accused should be considered "heroes" and the injured parties "separatists".

Third, the demand for "setting the historical record straight" in Papua and hopes for reconciliation have not been responded to wisely.

The Papuans' demands for freedom are connected with the historical issue. This problem will hamper Papua-Jakarta reconciliation and the effort to build healthier political ties. The people of Papua will continue to question their political history in various local, national and international forums.

The Vice President, and even the President himself, have emphasized the need to settle the problems of West Irian Jaya and Papua by taking account of the aspirations of the Papuan people and provincial leaders. Whatever course of action is decided upon in resolving the West Irian Jaya issue, Jakarta must avoid unilateral action. The Papuan side, particularly state leaders in the provincial council and MRP, and the governor, should be fully involved.

The West Irian Jaya problem looks likely to be long drawn out and will not be settled within one month as targeted by Vice President Jusuf Kalla. Differing views will arise between the governor of Papua and the MRP, with the governor accepting the splitting of Papua into five provinces and the MRP tending to reject this. This is not to mention the possible introduction of another agenda by the Ministry of Home Affairs in Jakarta, which is apparently set on pushing through the local election plan.

If the West Irian Jaya issue can be properly resolved, the central government and Papuan leadership will be able to prepare three peace agendas to get to the root of the conflict in Papua.

First, Papua's development can be accelerated based on a new special autonomy paradigm that prioritizes the empowerment of indigenous Papuans in the social economy, health and education sectors. Conflicts over natural resources should be resolved based on the principles of justice and benefit to local communities.

Spending on the Papuan bureaucracy should be reduced and priority given to community development spending. Parallel to this, corruption cases, such as that involving the Jayawijaya regent, should be brought to trial.

Second, human rights should be upheld while at the same time putting an end to the impunity enjoyed by the military and police. As a start, the Abepura case should be appeared. The files on the Wamena and Wasior cases should also be improved and delivered to the court for trial without delay. The entire legal process and control over prosecutors and judges should be tightened to prevent outside intervention on behalf of defendants.

Third, the question of "straightening out Papuan history", the territorial integrity of the Unitary Republic of Indonesia and reconciliation should be addressed by opening a dialog between Jakarta and Papua. This should be aimed at reaching a compromise between the "nationalist" and "separatist" poles.

In this regard, all the important elements of Papuan society should be represented, covering the grassroots like the Papuan Tribal Council, the Presidium of Papuan Councils and Churches and official leaders in Papua. The President should appoint a committee made up of members knowledgeable about Papuan affairs and experienced in negotiating. President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono has promised that the Aceh peace deal will be a model for Papua.

In the context of the internationalization of Papua, the government should realize that the best diplomacy would be improved Jakarta-Papua relations based upon concrete action in line with the three agendas described above.

There are two principal views in international circles on Papua.

Some NGOs and Indonesian experts believe that Papua could become a second Timor Leste. Other NGOs and Indonesian specialists disagree with this view because, first, Papua has been recognized as part of Indonesia by the United Nations since 1969 and, second, there has been explicit confirmation by influential nations like the U.S., Australia, the Netherlands and Britain that Indonesia has sovereignty over Papua.

The second group tends to believe that special autonomy is more logical and realistic for Papua.

Nonetheless, all the optimism could dissipate if, first, rights violations are ignored and the security forces continue to enjoy impunity; second, Indonesian troops, perhaps also police personnel, go out of control and commit new rights infringements; and, third, a unilateral policy on Papua continues to be imposed by the Ministry of Home Affairs, thus increasing antipathy on the part of both informal and formal Papuan leaders.

All this would give more reason to the international community to question the 1969 decision on integration and encourage a referendum in Papua. If this were to happens, a Jakarta-Papua political stalemate would be inevitable. Political violence would increase and disintegration would become part of the agenda.

The writer is a researcher at the Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI), Jakarta, and a PhD candidate in history at University of Leiden in the Netherlands.

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